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Commodity levies are used increasingly to fund producer collective goods such as 
research and promotion. In the present paper we examine theoretical relationships 
between producer and national beneﬁts from levy-funded research, and consider 
the implications for the appropriate rates of  matching government grants, applied 
with a view to achieving a closer match between producer and national interests. In 
many cases the producer and national optima coincide. First, regardless of  the 
form of  the supply shift, when product demand is perfectly elastic, or all the prod­
uct is exported, domestic beneﬁts and costs of  levy-funded research all go to pro­
ducers and they have appropriate incentives. Second, if  research causes a parallel 
supply shift, the producer share of  research beneﬁts is the same as their share of 
costs of  a levy, and their incentives are compatible with national interests. In such 
cases, a matching grant would cause an over-investment in research from a national 
perspective. However, if  demand is less than perfectly elastic, and research causes a 
pivotal supply shift, the producer share of  beneﬁts is smaller than their share of 
costs of  the levy, and they will under-invest in research from a national point of 
view. A matching grant can be justiﬁed in such cases, however the magnitude of  the 
optimal grant is sensitive to market conditions. 
1. Introduction 
Commodity levies and matching government subsidies have come to play a 
central role in the funding of  applied agricultural research in Australia 
(Industry Commission 1994), and levy-based funding is emerging as a more 
important funding mechanism in other countries. In the present paper we 
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develop a stylised model of  a levy-based research funding institution. This 
model captures the essentials of  the Australian Research and Development 
Corporation (RDC) framework, but is meant to be representative of  a 
more general class of  such institutions as may be implemented in other 
countries or at different times in Australia.1 We derive and compare the 
levy rate (and research expenditure) that a producer group – which for sim­
plicity and concreteness we refer to as an ‘RDC’ – would choose to maxi­
mise producer welfare and the levy rate that would maximise aggregate 
national welfare. Among other questions, this assessment provides a basis 
for evaluating the appropriate rate of  matching government grant to sup­
plement levy funds, for example the present common practice of  a dollar 
for dollar, or the lower 25 cents per dollar proposed by the Industry Com­
mission (1994), or something else.2 
We use a partial equilibrium, competitive market model in a comparative 
static format, building on models described by Duncan and Tisdell (1971), 
Lindner and Jarrett (1978) and many others, as surveyed by Alston et al. 
(1995). Previous studies have speciﬁed predetermined values for the rate of 
levy, the amount of  research, or, more commonly, the supply shift, and then 
assessed the consequent changes in prices and quantities, and the effects on 
consumer, producer and total economic surpluses. In contrast, the present 
paper establishes explicit linkages between changes in the levy rate, total 
research spending, and the size of  the research-induced shift in the supply 
curve, and consequent changes in market prices and quantities. We solve an 
optimisation problem for the levy rate (and research expenditure) that would 
maximise national economic surplus and show how that rate compares with 
1 RDCs have been used in Australia, particularly since the mid-1980s, as a government 
legislated institutional structure to internalise spillovers of  R&D among the many producers 
within a particular primary industry. Industry organisations negotiate with the Common­
wealth government to set the levy rate, usually speciﬁed per unit of  physical output but some­
times in ad valorem form. The Commonwealth government provides matching grants, in most 
cases on a dollar per dollar basis with an upper limit of 0.5 per cent of farm gate gross value of 
production, but there are options to vary the subsidy. Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry 
Australia (AFFA, 2002) provides more detail on the RDCs as presently structured. The Com­
monwealth and State governments also directly fund applied and especially basic research 
through the Commonwealth Scientiﬁc and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), univer­
sities and government departments and agencies. Government subsidies for applied research 
by the corporate sector, including agribusiness, are provided by tax concessions. 
2 The compulsory levies are collected by the Commonwealth. In 2001–02 the government 
distributed over #A400 million (levy receipts of #A209 million supplemented with the Common­
wealth contribution of #A196 million) to the RDCs, who are responsible for the allocation 
and administration of  the funds among research projects (Troeth 2003). The balance of  funds 
reﬂects the fact that some RDCs set levies in excess of  the 0.5 per cent upper limit such that 
their overall rate of  matching grant is less than 1:1, and some RDCs do not have a levy base 
and are entirely funded by the Commonwealth. 
   
 
  
  
  
 
    
the levy rate (and research expenditure) that would be chosen by a producer 
group to maximise producer surplus. To make this analysis tractable, we 
adopt and maintain the conventional assumptions of  undistorted markets – 
the absence of market power of ﬁrms, government price policies, and external 
beneﬁts and costs in production – and we assume that the beneﬁts from the 
R&D funded by the levy are reaped by consumers and producers of  the 
product on which the levy is collected. In the penultimate section of the pres­
ent paper, we discuss the implications of  relaxing these and other modelling 
assumptions. 
In the analysis, particular attention is given to the effects of  the nature of 
the research-induced supply shift (i.e., parallel versus pivotal shifts), com­
bined with the elasticities of  demand and supply, on the choices of  optimal 
levy rates and research quantities that would maximise beneﬁts for pro­
ducers and society.3 We show that, in the case of  a parallel supply curve 
shift, the distribution of  the beneﬁts from research between producers and 
consumers of  the commodity is identical to the distribution of  the costs of 
a levy used to ﬁnance the research. Consequently, for parallel supply curve 
shifts, the producers’ optimal levy choice is the same as that for society, and 
there is no need for a government subsidy. This result generalises to traded 
commodities, even when some of  the beneﬁts and costs may accrue to for­
eigners.4 However, with a multiplicative or pivotal supply curve shift, unless 
demand is perfectly elastic, producers bear a greater share of  the incidence 
of  the levy than their share of  research beneﬁts and, from a national per­
spective, they will opt for too little research in the absence of matching govern­
ment support. As we show below, the appropriate government matching grant 
for the producer levy depends on relative elasticities of  supply and demand 
and the trade status of  the commodity, along with other factors that inﬂu­
ence the incidence of  beneﬁts and costs. 
3 There has been much discussion in the published literature but as yet no consensus has 
been reached about how to determine the nature of  the research-induced shift of  the supply 
curve, whether it is parallel, pivotal, divergent or convergent – for example, Lindner and 
Jarrett (1978, 1980), Rose (1980) and Wise and Fell (1980). One set of  approaches uses a 
representative ﬁrm model with the supply curve derived from a production, cost or proﬁt 
function. R&D that augments factor inputs or enters the production function as a separate 
input results in a pivotal supply curve shift, but Martin and Alston (1997) show that a paral­
lel shift is obtained if  technology enters the proﬁt function as a separate input. Another 
modelling strategy allows for multiple ﬁrms with different reservation prices for entry to 
industry supply, reﬂecting differences in their minumum average cost of  production, for 
example Wohlgenant (1996). The nature of  the R&D induced supply curve shift then 
depends in part on which ﬁrms along the supply curve adopt the R&D (or which reservation 
prices are affected) and by how much costs are reduced. Accepting the lack of  consensus 
on this issue, we consider the extreme cases of  parallel and pivotal shifts. 
4 This point was made by the Industries Assistance Commission (1976, p. 267). 
     
 
    
 
 
  
 
  
 
We begin by outlining the conventional commodity market model for 
evaluating the effects on market outcomes resulting from R&D, a levy to 
fund it or both combined. In section 3 we derive formulas for the research-
funding levy rates that would maximise national economic surplus and pro­
ducer surplus, respectively, where the research causes either a parallel shift 
or a pivotal shift in supply. These solutions are functions of  elasticities of 
supply and demand, the fraction of  the commodity that is exported (allow­
ing that the innovating country may be an exporter), the rate of  matching 
government support, and the social opportunity cost of  government spend­
ing. Theoretical solutions are interpreted in section 4, with particular atten­
tion to the effects of  matching government grants, or subsidies, for levy 
rates and research conducted by producer bodies such as RDCs, and the 
policy implications of  the grants. To put the analytical solutions and inter­
pretations into context, in section 5 we present numerical values for the 
levy rates that would maximise beneﬁts for society versus producers, and 
the corresponding rates of  socially optimal matching grants, for various 
sets of  parameter values. These results are conditioned by various model­
ling assumptions, including competitive market clearing and the absence 
of  market distortions, and, more fundamentally, our approach of  using a 
partial equilibrium model in which we represent research-induced techno­
logical change in terms of  shifts of  commodity supply functions. In section 
6 we review certain assumptions, and some caveats to the results. Section 7 
concludes. 
2. A heuristic model of the incidence of levy-funded research 
In a standard commodity market model of  research beneﬁts, research 
causes the commodity supply curve to shift down and out against a stationary 
demand curve, giving rise to an increase in quantity produced and consumed, 
and a lower price. The collection of  a levy on the product to ﬁnance the re­
search has the opposite effects. The distribution of  the costs of  the imposi­
tion of  the levy between producers and consumers depends on the relative 
elasticities of  supply and demand.5 While the distribution of  the beneﬁts and 
costs of  the research-induced supply shift depends on the same elasticities, 
it also depends on the nature of  the supply shift and, less importantly, on 
the functional forms of  supply and demand (Alston et al. 1995). 
5 We use the Marshallian measures of  consumer surplus for consumer beneﬁts and of 
producer surplus for producer beneﬁts. In fact, producer surplus might include quasi-rents 
to factors owned by farmers, namely land and managerial expertise, and also to suppliers 
of  other factors such as professional advice, fertilisers, and machinery where the supply of 
these non-farm inputs is less than perfectly elastic. Similarly, consumer surplus might 
include quasi-rents earned by after-farm input suppliers as well as by ﬁnal consumers. 
     
 
   
 
   
 
  
 
   
 
      
 
   
 
   
 
       
 
   
 
                 
 
  
  
   
 
  
 
   
 
  
 
   
 
       
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
                
 
  
 
Figure 1 A commodity market model with a parallel supply shift. 
Consider ﬁrst the case of  a parallel research-induced supply shift in a 
model with linear supply and demand. In ﬁgure 1, D is the demand curve, 
S0 is the initial supply curve, and S 1 is the supply curve following a k per 
unit research-induced shift down of  the supply curve. As a result of  the 
supply shift, price falls from P0 to P1, and quantity increases from Q 0 to Q 1. 
The welfare effects include an increase in consumer surplus given by ∆CS = 
area P0abP1, and an increase in producer surplus given by ∆PS = area P1bI1 
− area P0aI0, which equals area P1bcd under the special assumption of  a 
parallel supply shift.6 National beneﬁts are given by ∆NS = ∆PS + ∆CS = 
area I0abI1. Now, suppose we introduce a tax of k per unit. This would 
exactly reverse the price, quantity, and economic welfare impacts of  the 
parallel research-induced supply shift. Hence, if  a k per unit tax could 
ﬁnance a research-induced supply shift of  greater than k per unit, there 
would be net beneﬁts to producers, consumers, and the nation as a whole. 
6 Here, k represents a vertical shift, down, or a k per unit reduction in unit costs. Alter­
natively we can discuss a horizontal or output-expansion effect as j = (∂Q /∂P)k, where ∂Q / 
∂P is the slope of  the supply function. As noted by Alston et al. (1995), and more recently 
elaborated by Oehmke and Crawford (2002), the elasticity of  supply can have important 
implications for measures of  research beneﬁts if  it is used to translate an assumed horizontal 
shift into a vertical shift, or vice versa, in this fashion. 
 
       
 
   
 
     
 
      
 
  
 
  
  
  
  
Figure 2 A commodity market model with a pivotal supply shift. 
These net beneﬁts would be shared in direct proportion to each group’s 
share of  the costs, and so the research investment that would be optimal 
from the point of  view of  the nation as a whole would also be optimal for 
consumers and for producers.7 In this setting, if  producers were empowered 
to set a levy to fund research, their incentives to maximise their own beneﬁts 
would be exactly compatible with the national interest, and there would be 
no reason to encourage producers to do more of  it by offering a matching 
grant to help pay for the research. 
Alternatively, suppose research causes a multiplicative (pivotal) supply 
shift, as shown in ﬁgure 2, from S 0 to S 2.
8 The total research beneﬁts are 
now only roughly one-half  of  those from a parallel shift that would have 
7 Speciﬁcally, the producer share of  both beneﬁts and costs is given by the ratio η / 
(η + ε), where η and ε are the absolute values of  the elasticities (or price slopes) of  demand 
and supply respectively. The consumer share is ε /(η + ε). 
8 For simplicity, we have held constant the effects on quantity of  the parallel and pivotal 
supply shifts, rather than the effects on per unit costs in the vicinity of  the equilibrium. The 
main issue for the comparison is the shapes of  the geometric areas, not the sizes of  them, 
but it is worth noting that one source of  confusion in the published literature has been dif­
ferences among studies in what is being held constant in comparing alternative research-
induced supply shifts. 
 
 
 
   
           
 
  
Figure 3 Producer and national incentives for different types of  research. 
the same price and quantity effects: ∆NS = area I 0ab. The consumer bene­
ﬁts are the same as from the corresponding parallel shift: ∆CS = area 
P0abP1, while the producer beneﬁts are smaller: ∆PS = area P1bI0 − area 
P0aI0; and if  demand were inelastic, producer beneﬁts would be negative.
9 
Since the distribution of  costs of  a per unit levy coincides exactly with the 
distribution of  beneﬁts from a parallel research-induced supply shift, it fol­
lows that consumers would receive more than their proportionate share of 
beneﬁts from (or pay less than their share of  costs of ) a pivotal research-
induced supply shift funded by a per unit levy. Similarly, producers would 
receive less than their proportionate share of  beneﬁts (or pay more than 
their share of  costs), and in this setting, producers would opt to fund less 
than the national optimum quantity of  research. 
Figure 3 represents these ideas graphically, by showing how total and 
marginal national and producer beneﬁts might be expected to change with 
changes in the rate of  levy or, equivalently, in the rate of  spending on 
research (R) ﬁnanced by the levy, and the implications for divergences to 
9 1 1 1Speciﬁcally, in ﬁgure 2, ∆PS =  (P1 − I0)Q 1 −  (P0 − I0)Q0 =  (P1Q 1 − P0Q 0 − I0 ∆Q ).2 2 2 
Given I0∆Q > 0, a necessary condition for producer surplus to increase is for total revenue 
to increase (i.e., P1Q 1 > P0Q 0), and this requires that demand is elastic. 
 
  
 
  
arise between farmer and national optima, R*(F ) and R*(N ), respectively. 
The vertical axis measures total net beneﬁts. The uppermost curve (NS1) 
represents national beneﬁts in the case of  a parallel shift, and the next 
curve (PS1) represents the producer beneﬁts from the parallel shift. The 
third curve down (NS2) represents national beneﬁts in the case of  a pivotal 
shift, and the fourth (PS2) represents the producer beneﬁts from the pivotal 
shift. In this comparison, we assume that the costs of  research are compa­
rable for given market outcomes (i.e., effects on prices and quantities) 
between the two types of  supply shifts, and hence the national and pro­
ducer beneﬁts from the pivotal shift are smaller for any given research 
investment. In each case the relevant optimum is where marginal net bene­
ﬁts are zero. In the case of  the parallel research-induced supply shift, the 
producer and national optima coincide at R 1 *(N ). The national *(F ) = R 1
optimal quantity of  research is smaller for the pivotal supply shift, and the 
producer share of  beneﬁts is smaller so that the producer optimum in this 
case is less than the already smaller national optimum. 
These results illustrate how, depending on the nature of  the research-
induced supply shift, levy-based funding arrangements for research may or 
may not lead to a socially efﬁcient outcome in terms of  the total amount of 
research provided. In the case of  a parallel research-induced supply shift, 
an RDC maximising total producer beneﬁts would also maximise national 
beneﬁts in the absence of  further government intervention. However, some 
form of matching support from the government may be useful for correct­
ing an under-investment in the case of  non-parallel research-induced supply 
shifts. 
The heuristic model has abstracted from some important real-world 
aspects that are especially relevant to a discussion of  matching government 
grant for research. In particular, most Australian commodities with RDCs 
are extensively traded, mostly exported to other countries, which means 
that demand is likely to be elastic, perhaps highly so. Indeed, for many 
commodities, Australia’s relatively small share of  world production implies 
that a small-country assumption often may be a reasonable approximation, 
which means we can effectively ignore the demand side altogether in our 
analysis of  research beneﬁts and costs. However, for several commodities – 
for instance, wool, wheat, and beef  – it might be argued that, in the relevant 
intermediate length of  run, although the demand for the industry’s output 
is highly elastic, it is not perfectly elastic, reﬂecting the reality of  extensive 
policy interventions in trade, product heterogeneity, both real and per­
ceived, and the importance of  transport costs for low-value bulk commod­
ities. In these cases, the analysis needs to be extended to partition the total 
demand between domestic and export counterparts, since any beneﬁts to 
foreigners would be given a different weight (perhaps zero weight) in the 
 
  
calculus for maximising domestic welfare. This partitioning also means 
that, in the large-country case, the national social cost is less than a dollar 
per dollar raised using a commodity levy. 
In contrast, the national social cost is more than a dollar per dollar of 
expenditure from general revenue. Instruments used to raise the tax revenue 
to fund subsidies distort decisions, for example, between work versus leisure, 
saving versus spending, the choice of  business structure and investment 
options, and the mix of  products produced and consumed. These distortions 
result in deadweight or efﬁciency costs of taxes of at least 20 per cent (Campbell 
and Bond 1997), which may have implications for the socially optimal 
amount of  research to fund, and the least-cost funding mechanism for agri­
cultural R&D. 
These issues of  matching grants, trade status, and the social opportunity 
cost of  government funds are addressed in the more formal model that is 
developed in the next section. Then, in subsequent sections, we evaluate the 
implications of  these aspects for the nature of  the divergence between pro­
ducer and national optimal levy rates, and for socially optimal matching 
grants, in terms of  both analytical solutions and numerical examples. 
Throughout we maintain the assumption that the producer group or ‘RDC’ 
seeks to maximise total producer surplus, regardless of  the distribution of 
beneﬁts and costs among producers. As pointed out by a referee, this is an 
important simplifying assumption. It is unlikely that the collective pro­
ducer optimum will be optimal for every producer. Even though every pro­
ducer pays a share of  the levy, it is unlikely that each will receive the 
corresponding share of  the total beneﬁts; non-adopters, for instance, will 
clearly be made worse off  by levy-funded R&D. A more realistic model 
might allow speciﬁcally for heterogeneous producers, with RDCs choosing a 
portfolio of  projects, aiming to achieve a more uniform distribution of  bene­
ﬁts than might result from simply maximising total beneﬁts – a political 
trade-off  of  efﬁciency for equity in levy-funded research, as discussed by 
Alston (2002). In our analysis, we effectively have taken the nature of  the 
(portfolio of ) levy-funded research and the research-induced supply shift as 
given, but not the quantity of  research. Then it makes sense for the RDC 
to choose the quantity of  such research that will maximise total producer 
beneﬁts and for the government to encourage the RDC to choose the quan­
tity of  such research that will maximise total national beneﬁts, as assumed 
in our analysis. 
3. A more formal model 
This section uses a more formal representation of  the model of  ﬁgures 1 
and 2 to derive the levy rates, and by implication research quantities, that 
 
     
     
   
  
 
   
   
  
   
 
  
   
  
   
 
  
    
  
  
    
  
  
society and producers would choose to maximise their respective objectives, 
under a more-general set of  conditions. To begin, we express the initial pre-
research and pre-levy demand and supply curves in price dependent form 
as: 
D −1(Q) = P = γ − δQ  
S −1(Q) = P = α + βQ  
where P is the price, Q is quantity, and α, β, γ, and δ are given non-negative 
parameters. 
R&D is funded by a per unit levy, t, supplemented with a matching govern­
ment grant at a rate, g, such that the research quantity, R, is given by 
R = (1 + g) tQ.  
Incorporating the effects of  the levy, the equilibrium quantity and price are: 
γ − α − t
Qi = δ + β 
γ β  + δα  + δ t
P =i δ + β 
where P is the consumer price, gross of  tax, and the producer price is given 
by P − t.10 
The research funded by the levy causes an outward shift of  the supply 
curve, and in what follows we consider two alternatives for the nature of 
shift. In the case of  a parallel shift, denoted by i = 1 in the expressions 
above, research modiﬁes α in equation (2) and hence in equations (4) and 
(5). In the case of  a pivotal shift, denoted by i = 2 in the expressions above, 
research modiﬁes β in equation (2) and hence in equations (4) and (5). In 
other words, we incorporate the effects of  parallel or pivotal research-
induced supply shifts in equations (4) and (5) by expressing either α or β as 
a function of  research spending, R, denoted by i = 1 or i = 2, respectively. 
10 The results do not depend on whether the policy is deﬁned as a per unit levy or an ad 
valorem levy. Below, we express each solution for an ‘optimal’ per unit levy, t as an equivalent 
ad valorem rate, τ, where τ = t/P, and identical results would have been obtained if  we had 
deﬁned the policy instrument as an ad valorem levy, instead, in the ﬁrst instance. 
 
    
    
 
 
 
 
      
  
   
  
    
  
  
3.1 Parallel supply curve shift 
For a parallel shift, as in ﬁgure 1, the intercept term of  the supply curve (α 
in equation (2)) is a function of R, with ∂α /∂R < 0 and ∂ 2α /∂R 2 > 0 to 
reﬂect diminishing cost reductions for extra research effort. Then, with 
levy-funded R&D, the prices and quantities are given by solving 
P1 = γ − δQ1 (6) 
P1 − t = α (R) + βQ1, (7) 
the solution for which will have the same form as equations (4) and (5), 
with α (R) replacing α. 
3.1.1 National optimum 
National surplus is equal to the sum of  domestic producer and consumer 
surplus minus the cost to taxpayers associated with any matching government 
support for research. Let us deﬁne d as the excess burden per dollar asso­
ciated with that spending, such that 1 + d is the marginal social opportunity 
cost (or loss of  taxpayer surplus) associated with a dollar of  government 
spending on agricultural research. Therefore, the taxpayer cost is (1 + d )gtQ, 
g
or, using equation (3), (1 + d ) R. Then, in the case of a closed economy, 
(1 + g) 
with all of  the welfare impacts conﬁned to the domestic economy, national 
surplus, NS1, is deﬁned as 
Q1  g 
−1 −1NS = D x − S x dx − (1 + d ) R (8)1  [ ( )  ( )]   
0 1 + g 
1 2  g  
= (δ + β )Q1 − (1 + d ) R 2 1 + g  
where the second line of  (8) exploits the speciﬁc linear functions (6) and (7). 
In the case of  an exporting country, where domestic consumption is only 
a fraction, κ, of total production, domestic consumer beneﬁts may be approx­
imated by the corresponding fraction, κ, of  the total ‘consumer’ beneﬁts. 
Presuming that the government gives no weight to welfare impacts on foreigners, 
we can approximate the exporter’s national beneﬁts using 
1 2  g  NS1 = (κδ  + β)Q1 − (1 + d ) R . (9)2 1 + g  
 
   
 
 
   
 
    
  
  
    
  
  
       
  
Then, the nation will choose a research quantity, R, to maximise (9), which 
will satisfy the ﬁrst-order condition implied by ∂NS1/∂R = 0, subject to the 
constraint that expenditure on research is equal to the revenue raised by 
the levy plus any matching support provided by the government, as in 
equation (3). 
Solving this maximisation problem yields an equation for the national 
optimum levy rate, as a function of  the elasticity of  marginal cost with 
respect to research, εC,R, the elasticity of  supply, ε, the absolute value of  the 
elasticity of demand, η, domestic consumption as a share of output, κ, the rate 
of matching government support, g, and the marginal excess burden of taxation 
to ﬁnance government spending, d, which we can represent as follows:11 
 η ε+ −1 
τ ε  C R, 1 ( )  . (10)≈  + +  1 d g  η κ ε+ 
Notice that, in this equation, unless the government is applying a matching 
grant (i.e., g > 0), the optimal levy is simply equal to the elasticity of marginal 
cost with respect to research. Finally, using the deﬁnition that, under compet­
itive market clearing, the elasticity of  marginal cost with respect to research 
(εC,R) is equal to the elasticity of supply with respect to research (εQ,R) divided 
by the elasticity of  supply (i.e., εC,R = εQ,R/ε), we can write, equivalently, 
εQ R   η ε −1 + 
≈
, + +  d gτ 1 (1 ) . (11) ε η κ+ ε 
This form is more useful for comparing alternative forms of  research-
induced supply shift, holding εQ,R constant. 
3.1.2 Producer optimum 
Consider now the RDC or producer objective function, which is to maximise 
producer surplus, PS, given by 
Q1 1
−1 2P − t Q − S x dx = βQ . (12)PS1 = ( 1 ) 1 ( )  1 
0 2 
11 Details of  the solution procedure and the exact solutions for all of  the optimal levy 
rates discussed below are provided in the appendix. The exact solutions for the optimal levy 
rates in every case (apart from the producers’ optimum with a parallel shift, in equation 
(13)) are quadratic functions, but since research-funding levies are typically less than 1 per 
cent, the quadratic term is negligible, and the linear approximation will be very close. 
 
  
  
  
      
 
  
   
     
 
    
    
  
  
Producer surplus is maximised where ∂PS1/∂R = 0, which in this case is 
where ∂Q1/∂R = 0. In other words, producer surplus is maximised when the 
marginal impact on output of  an increase in research spending is just bal­
anced by the marginal impact of  the increase in the research levy required 
to fund that increase in spending. Using this ﬁrst-order condition with the 
budget-constraint condition, from equation (3), implies the following solu­
tion for the producers’ optimal levy rate, τp: 
εQ R,τ = ε , = . (13)p  C R  ε 
Hence, the producer choice of R to maximise (12) implies the same levy rate 
as the societal choice implied by (11) in the absence of a matching govern­
ment grant; that is, τ p = τ if g = 0, as suggested by the heuristic model. 
3.2 Pivotal supply curve shift 
For a pivotal supply curve shift, as in ﬁgure 2, the β parameter of  the supply 
function (2) is replaced by βφ (R), with 0 < φ ≤ 1, ∂φ /∂R < 0 and ∂ 2φ /∂R2 > 
0 to reﬂect diminishing cost reductions for extra research effort. Then, 
with levy-funded R&D, the equilibrium price and quantity are given by 
solving 
P2 = γ − δQ 2 (14) 
P2 − t = α + βφ (R)Q 2 (15) 
which yields solutions for the equilibrium quantity and price as expressed 
in equations (4) and (5), with βφ (R) replacing β. 
3.2.1 National optimum 
Allowing once again for exports, with the domestic share of  consumption 
and consumer surplus represented by κ, when research causes a pivotal shift 
of  the supply function, national surplus is given by, 
1 2  g  NS2 = (κδ  + β φ  (R))Q2 − (1 + d )   R . (16)2 1 + g 
Then, as in the case of  the parallel research-induced supply shift, to ﬁnd the 
research quantity or levy rate to maximise national surplus, we combine the 
ﬁrst-order condition for a maximum with the budget-constraint condition, 
from equation (3). The result is: 
 
  
  
  
    
  
  
  
  
, ( + (1 εQ R   2 η κε) −  +  η ε  ) τ ≈ , (17) ( + +    ) (2 ε η κ+ ε) (1 d g  η ε  + ) 
where parameters are deﬁned as above. 
3.2.2 Producer optimum 
Producer surplus, as deﬁned in equation (12), reﬂects the effects of  both the 
collection of  a levy to fund research and the research-induced supply shift. 
In the case of  a pivotal shift, as shown in equation (15) the slope (βφ) is a 
function of  research, which changes the implications for producer welfare: 
1 2PS2 = βφ R Q 2 . (18)( )2 
Then, as in the case of  the parallel research-induced supply shift, we solve 
for the levy rate that would maximise producer beneﬁts by combining the 
ﬁrst-order condition for a maximum derived from equation (18) with the 
budget-constraint condition, from equation (3). The result is: 
1 εQ R   η ε−  ,τ p ≈   , (19)2 ε  η 
where the elasticities are as deﬁned above. As implied by previous work on 
the incidence of  research beneﬁts, it will be worthwhile for producers to 
levy themselves only if  demand is elastic (i.e., η > 1) since a pivotal supply 
shift results in a reduction of  producer surplus when demand is inelastic, 
even when the research is provided for free (e.g., see Lindner and Jarrett 
1978).12 Further, equation (19) means that producers will ﬁnd levy-funded 
research beneﬁcial only if  demand is more elastic than supply (i.e., η > ε). 
Intuitively, the more elastic is demand, the smaller is the price reduction 
effect of  research in reducing producer returns, and the less elastic is supply 
the greater is the cost reduction gain from a given output expansion. 
12 de Gorter and Zilberman (1990) compared producer and national optimal investments 
in R&D, where the research could be funded entirely by producers, entirely by the govern­
ment, or with a mixture of  government and industry funding. Although they do not make 
this interpretation, given their ﬁnding that producers are necessarily made worse off  if 
demand is inelastic, their results are consistent only with technological change that causes 
a multiplicative supply shift. Further, they assumed that the producer funding would be 
provided in a lump-sum way, with 100 per cent incidence on producers, rather than through 
a levy, which enables some of  the ﬁnal incidence to be shifted to consumers. 
 
  
      
  
      
  
            
  
  
Table 1 Private (producer) and national optimal research funding levy rates: a large-country 
exporter with matching grants (κ < 1; g > 0; η < ∞) 
Parallel shift Pivotal shift 
 η κ + η ε  ( + ε )  1  2(η κε ) − +  ( ) 
τ (ε ε  / )  (ε ε  / )  Q R,   ,   ( d g η ε   Q R   +  + +  ) ( + (η κ+ ε ) + +  1 ) ( + ) 2 (η κε ) (1 d g η ε  ) 
1
τ ε /ε (ε  ε η ε η/  )(  − )/  p Q,R Q R2 , 
(η κε ) + +  1 ) ( + ) (η κε ) ( d g η ε  )( d g η ε    +  + +  +  1 ) ( +
τp /τ    η ε η   ( − )/   ( + ε )   2(η κε ) − +  ( η κ + η ε  ) 
4. Interpretation of analytical results 
Table 1 summarises the analytical results in terms of  equations for optimal 
levy rates, for both the pivotal and parallel research-induced supply shifts, 
from the points of  view of  both the nation (i.e., τ) and producers (i.e., τp).
13 
The ratio of  the producers’ optimum to the national optimum provides an 
indication of  whether producers might over- or under-invest in levy-funded 
research from the national viewpoint. As table 1 shows, in general the equa­
tions for producer and national optimal levy rates differ. The nature and 
causes of  those differences can be illustrated by considering various special 
cases. To consider the implications of  the country’s trade status, we ﬁrst 
assume the absence of  government grants. Then we turn to a consideration 
of  the ‘optimal’ rates of  matching government grants. 
4.1 Implications of trade status 
Table 2 includes the optimal levy rates implied by the more general coun­
terparts in table 1 in the case with no matching government grants (i.e., 
g = 0). These results are consistent with our expectations, from the heuristic 
analysis in section 2. Speciﬁcally, in the case of  a parallel research-induced 
supply shift the producer incentives for levy-funded research are compat­
ible with the national interest, and producers’ choice of  a levy rate that 
maximises producer surplus will also maximise national economic surplus. 
These results hold regardless of  whether the commodity is traded or 
whether the nation has market power in trade. Hence, in the case of  a 
13 If  the research provides spillover beneﬁts in the form of  lower production costs for 
rest-of-world producers, the optimum levy rates for producers and for the nation as an 
aggregate will be lower than these equations imply. 
 
  
  
    
  
    
 
 
  
  
 
  
   
  
  
    
 
  
  
 2 Private (producer) and national optimal research funding levy rates: a large-country 
exporter with no matching grants (κ < 1; g = 0; η < ∞) 
Parallel shift Pivotal shift 
1 2 η κε ) (η ε  )( +  − +  
τ ε ,R/ε (ε ε  / )  Q ,  2 Q R   (η κ+ ε ) 
1
τ ε (ε  ε η ε η/  )(  − )/  p Q,R/ε 2 Q R, 
(η κε )  +
τ /τ 1  (η ε η  p  − )/  2(η κε ) η ε  )+ (− +  
Table 3 Effects of trade status on producer and national optimal research funding levy rates 
for a pivotal research-induced supply shift with no matching grants 
Large exporter 
η < ∞; κ < 1 
Closed economy 
η < ∞; κ = 1 
Small exporter 
η = ∞; κ < 1 
τ 
τp 
1 
2 
2
(  /  )  
( ) ( ) 
( ), 
ε  ε  
η κε  η ε  
η κεQ R  
+  −  +  
+ 
 
 
 
 
1 
2 
(  /  ) (  )/  , ε  ε η ε ηQ R  −
1 
2 
(  /  )  , ε  εQ R  
1 
2 
(  /  ) (  )/  , ε  ε η ε ηQ R  −
1 
2 
(  /  )  , ε  εQ R  
1 
2 
(  /  )  , ε  εQ R  
τp/τ 
(  )  
(  )  (  )  
(  )/  
η κε
η κε η ε
η ε η  + 
+  −  +  
 
 
 
 
− 
2 
(η − ε) /η 1 
parallel research-induced supply shift, a matching grant means that the 
producers’ optimal levy exceeds the national optimum. In contrast, and 
also as expected, in general the producer and national optima do not co­
incide in the case of  a pivotal research-induced supply shift, and a matching 
grant might be warranted in this case. 
To explore these and related aspects further we consider some other 
special cases for the case of  a pivotal research-induced supply shift. In table 
3 we replicate the results for the case of  a large-country exporter (i.e., 
η < ∞, and κ < 1) from table 2, and we compare these with the correspond­
ing results for a non-traded good (i.e., η < ∞, and κ = 1), and a small-country 
exporter (i.e., η = ∞, and κ < 1), all in the absence of  matching government 
grants (i.e., g = 0). The results in table 3 show that, in the small-country 
case such that demand is perfectly elastic (i.e., η = ∞), τp = τ ; the producer and 
national optima coincide. In this case there are no price falls or consumer 
beneﬁts, so producer beneﬁts represent national beneﬁts. In the closed 
economy case, however, where demand is less than perfectly elastic, the 
producers’ levy choice, τp is less than the national optimum τ, and the RDC 
 
  
  
   
  
  
  
    
  
will invest less than the social optimum in R&D. In this case, consumers do 
receive some beneﬁts, and the more elastic is supply relative to demand, the 
larger is the discrepancy between the producer optimum and the national 
optimum. This result formalises the earlier discussion suggesting that, with 
a pivotal supply curve shift, the producers’ share of  the levy costs is greater 
than their share of  the beneﬁts from research. Hence, a subsidy may be 
required to induce producers to choose the socially optimal levy rate. Fur­
ther, considering the results in table 2 and table 3 together, we can see that 
in the case of  a small exporter or a closed economy, the nation’s optimal 
levy in the case of  a pivotal shift is half  that for a parallel shift.14 
4.2 Optimal rates of matching government grant 
This section draws on the preceding results to assess the consequences of 
matching grants for levy rates and draw implications for the ‘optimal’ rate 
of  matching grant; that is, that rate that will result in a producer or RDC 
choice of  levy rate that will maximise net national beneﬁts (τ = τ p). In the 
case of  a parallel supply shift, the optimal rate of  matching grant is zero, 
regardless of  the other elements of  the model. However, in the case of  a 
pivotal supply shift, the optimal rate of  subsidy will vary with the relative 
elasticities of  demand and supply. To ﬁnd the optimal rate of  matching sup­
port, we set τ from equation (17) equal to τ p from equation (19) and solved 
for g. The result is: 
κε    η  −1 
g* = = κ (1 + d )  − 1 . (20)( + d )(  − ) ε1 η ε     
Then, the optimal matching grant is greater, the less important are exports, 
the more elastic is supply relative to demand, and the smaller is the social 
opportunity cost of  government revenue. Only by an unlikely coincidence 
will equation (20) imply a value of g = 1, necessary to warrant a dollar for 
dollar matching grant. 
In summary, we have identiﬁed several scenarios in which an RDC seek­
ing to maximise domestic producer surplus could be expected to choose the 
levy and quantity of  research that will maximise national research beneﬁts. 
This incentive compatibility is found regardless of elasticities or the country’s 
14 In table 2, in the case of  a parallel shift regardless of  trade status the national optimum 
is τ = εQ,R/ε, and in table 3 in the case of  a pivotal shift for a closed economy or a small 
open economy the national optimum is τ = 2
1 εQ,R /ε. 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
trade status in cases when research causes a parallel shift of  the supply 
curve, but only if  all of  the commodity is exported (i.e., κ = 0) or demand is 
perfectly elastic in cases when research causes a pivotal shift of  the supply 
curve. In any of  these scenarios, justiﬁcation for government matching 
grants for the types of  applied research funded by RDCs would have to be 
based on either the view that surplus accruing to producers and consumers 
of  the commodity does not represent national beneﬁts (owing to spillover 
beneﬁts to other commodities and parts of  the economy, as considered by 
the Industry Commission 1994),15 or a perception that RDCs were not seek­
ing simply to maximise total domestic producer surplus, regardless of  its 
distribution (for reasons such as those suggested by Alston (2002), including 
diversity of  interests among heterogeneous producers within an industry 
covered by an RDC, and inter-temporal distributional aspects). 
In contrast, we have shown that where research leads to pivotal shifts of 
the supply curve, and demand is less than perfectly elastic, producers will 
choose a lower levy rate and less research than would be optimal for soci­
ety. Here there is a prima facie case for some form of  government subsidy. 
However, our analysis ﬁnds against a blanket dollar for dollar matching 
grant (i.e., g = 1) for all situations. First, if  demand is inelastic, or the 
demand elasticity is less than the supply elasticity, producers will choose a 
zero levy even though society would beneﬁt from research, regardless of  a 
matching grant, making it an ineffective subsidy instrument. Second, even 
in those scenarios where producers would in their own interests levy them­
selves to fund research, but by less than would maximise national welfare, 
the optimal matching grant will vary with the commodity supply and 
demand elasticities and with the importance of  trade. 
5. Illustrative numbers 
This section provides estimates of  the levy rates that would maximise bene­
ﬁts to producers and the nation under a range of  market assumptions, to 
illustrate the contrasts and similarities between these rates under different 
market circumstances. In particular, the illustrations highlight the import­
ance of  parallel versus pivotal research-induced supply shifts and, for the 
case of  a pivotal supply curve shift, the importance of  different demand 
and supply elasticities and export shares of  total sales. In all the illustra­
tions we assume an elasticity of  output with respect to research, εQ,R of 
0.01. For a parallel supply curve shift and supply elasticity of ε = 1, the 
15 Given the emphasis of  RDC research portfolios on applied research, the relative 
importance of  cross-commodity spillovers has been challenged (e.g., Industry Commission 
1994). 
 
  
    
  
  
   
  
  
  
  
Table 4 Effects of elasticities on choices of levy rates by society and producers to fund pivotal 
and parallel research-induced supply shifts in a closed economy 
Supply 
elasticity 
Demand 
elasticity 
Parallel shift 
τp = τ τ 
Pivotal shift 
τp g 
1.0 0.2 
0.5 
1.0 
2.0 
4.0 
– optimal rates times 100 per cent – 
1.00 0.50 
1.00 0.50 
1.00 0.50 
1.00 0.50 
1.00 0.50 
– 
– 
– 
0.25 
0.38 
– 
– 
– 
1.00 
0.33 
2.0 0.2 
0.5 
1.0 
2.0 
4.0 
0.50 
0.50 
0.50 
0.50 
0.50 
0.25 
0.25 
0.25 
0.25 
0.25 
– 
– 
– 
– 
0.13 
– 
– 
– 
– 
1.00 
elasticity of  output with respect to research is equal to the elasticity of  mar­
ginal and average cost with respect to research, εQ,R = εC,R, and the optimal 
levy rate for both producers and the nation is τ p = τ = 0.01, or 1 per cent. 
Current Australian RDC levy rates are less than 1 per cent. 
Table 4 reports values of  the research levy rates expressed in percentage 
terms (i.e., τp or τ times 100), which maximise either national welfare or 
producer surplus for the case of  a non-traded commodity (i.e., where 
domestic consumption equals production and κ = 1). We combine supply 
elasticities of  1.0 or 2.0 with a domestic demand elasticity of  0.2, 0.5, 1.0, 
2.0, or 4.0, and consider cases where R&D shifts the supply curve either in 
a parallel fashion or pivotally. For example, with a supply elasticity of  1.0 
and a demand elasticity of  0.2, for a parallel supply shift both producers 
and society would chose a 1.0 per cent levy rate, but for a pivotal shift society 
would set a 0.5 per cent levy and producers a zero levy rate. In this setting, 
with ε = 1 and η = 2, a matching grant of  one dollar per dollar would be 
optimal if  the marginal social opportunity cost of  government spending is 
#A1.00 (i.e., d = 0.0), 83.3 cents per dollar if  the marginal social opportunity 
cost is #A1.20 (i.e., d = 0.20). But these are comparatively unlikely elasticity 
scenarios. In most cases the domestic demand for agricultural products is 
likely to be highly inelastic, and this means that demand for non-traded 
goods is likely to be less elastic than supply such that producers will not 
proﬁt from pivotal supply shifts. 
The levy rates in table 4 can be read in conjunction with the general 
propositions illustrated in ﬁgure 3. For a parallel supply curve shift, pro­
ducers and society choose the same levy rate. The levy rate does not depend 
on the demand elasticity, but a larger supply elasticity reduces the levy rate 
 
  
  
  
    
   
    
  
Table 5 Effects of trade status on choices of levy rates by society and producers, and the opti­
mal rate of matching grant, for a pivotal supply shift, ε = 1 and εQ,R = 0.01 
Export 
share of sales 
((1 − κ) × 100) 
Export 
demand 
elasticity 
(ηe) 
Total 
demand 
elasticity 
(η) 
Levies (%) 
National 
optimum 
(τ × 100) 
Producer 
optimum 
(τ p × 100) 
Optimal 
matching grants (%) 
(g × 100) 
(d = 0.0) (d = 0.2) 
100 (%) ∞ 
20 
10 
5 
1 
∞ 
20 
10 
5 
1 
0.50 
0.48 
0.45 
0.40 
0.00 
0.50 
0.48 
0.45 
0.40 
0.00 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
80 (%) ∞ 
20 
10 
5 
1 
∞ 
16.0 
8.0 
4.0 
0.8 
0.50 
0.48 
0.45 
0.41 
0.12 
0.50 
0.47 
0.44 
0.38 
0.00 
0.0 
1.3 
2.8 
6.6 
– 
0.0 
1.1 
2.4 
5.5 
– 
50 (%) ∞ 
20 
10 
5 
1 
∞ 
10.1 
5.1 
2.6 
0.6 
0.50 
0.48 
0.46 
0.42 
0.27 
0.50 
0.45 
0.40 
0.31 
0.00 
0.0 
5.5 
12.2 
31.3 
– 
0.0 
4.5 
10.2 
26.0 
– 
20 (%) ∞ 
20 
10 
5 
1 
∞ 
4.1 
2.1 
1.2 
0.4 
0.50 
0.48 
0.47 
0.45 
0.41 
0.50 
0.38 
0.27 
0.07 
0.00 
0.0 
25.3 
69.0 
500.0 
– 
0.0 
21.1 
57.5 
416.7 
– 
Non-traded – 0.2 0.50 0.00 – – 
Entries are based on domestic supply and demand elasticities of ε = 1.0, and ηd = 0.2 
η = κηd + (1 − κ)ηe 
because it translates a given quantity increase resulting from research into 
a smaller per unit cost reduction. For a pivotal supply curve shift, the 
national optimum levy rate is half  of  that for a parallel shift. The producers’ 
optimum levy rate is smaller again, and the results in table 4 conﬁrm that 
producers would not invest in levy-funded R&D when demand is inelastic 
and, when it is elastic, only when demand is more elastic than supply. The 
majority of  situations covered in the table would see no producer invest­
ment in levy-funded research, even though such activity would be of  value 
to society. 
Table 5 reports estimates of  the national and producer optimal levy rates 
for the case of  an exported product where R&D causes a pivotal shift of  the 
supply curve, under various market circumstances, as well as the cor­
responding rates of  matching government grants required to equate the 
national and producer optimal levy rates. Estimates were computed by 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
combining export shares (100 times 1 − κ) of  100 per cent, 80 per cent, 50 
per cent, or 20 per cent with export demand elasticities of ∞, 20, 10, 5 or 1, 
and a domestic supply elasticity of  1 (comparable results using a supply 
elasticity of  2 are reported in table 6). For all cases the domestic demand 
elasticity is held constant at 0.2, and the elasticity of  output with respect to 
research is set at 0.01, as for table 4. The derived aggregate demand elasti­
city in the third column is the share-weighted average of  the export demand 
elasticity and the ﬁxed domestic demand elasticity (e.g., an export elasticity 
of  10 with 50 per cent exports gives a derived total demand elasticity of 
5.1). This means that changes in the domestic share (κ) imply changes in 
the overall demand elasticity (η), and in our solutions the indirect effect on 
η is more important than the direct effect of  changing κ. Each row of  the 
table shows the optimal levy rates and optimal rates of  matching grant 
implied by a particular combination of  elasticities. For instance, where 80 
per cent of  the product is exported, with an export demand elasticity of  5 
and a supply elasticity of  1, society would choose a levy rate of  0.41 per 
cent, and producers would choose a lower levy rate of  0.38 per cent. In this 
scenario, if  the government were to offer a matching grant of g = 6.6 per 
cent (or 6.6 cents per dollar of  levy revenue), the producers’ optimal choice 
of  levy rate would become the rate that would maximise national welfare. 
If, however, a dollar of  government spending entailed a marginal opportu­
nity cost of #A1.20 per dollar, the optimal rate of  matching grant would be 
reduced to 5.5 per cent. 
Some key results highlighted in table 5 are as follows. When export 
demand is perfectly elastic, or when all of  the product is exported, there are 
no domestic consumer beneﬁts from research, and producers choose the 
levy rate that would maximise national net beneﬁts. In all other cases pro­
ducers choose a lower levy rate, and the difference is greater the less import­
ant are exports and the less elastic is export demand (i.e., when the overall 
demand is less elastic). Table 6 replicates table 5 using a supply elasticity of 
2.0 instead of  1.0. It can be seen that a larger supply elasticity reduces the 
levy rates that would be chosen by both the nation and producers, but the 
patterns in the results are otherwise similar. 
In many cases, with a pivotal supply shift, the levy rate chosen by pro­
ducers will be very different from the national optimum. This divergence 
increases as we move down the tables (5 and 6), increasing the domestic 
consumption share, the main consequence of  which is to reduce the overall 
demand elasticity, reducing the export demand elasticity, which also 
reduces the overall demand elasticity, or both. In extreme cases (with 20 per 
cent or less of  the commodity exported and an export demand elasticity of 
10 or less), the implied overall demand elasticity is 2.1 or less. Given a sup­
ply elasticity of  1 or 2, such a small demand elasticity implies a very large 
 
  
  
  
  
    
   
    
  
Table 6 Effects of trade status on choices of levy rates by society and producers, and the opti­
mal rate of matching grant, for a pivotal supply shift, ε = 2 and εQ,R = 0.01 
Export 
share of sales 
((1 − κ ) × 100) 
Export 
demand 
elasticity 
(η e) 
Total 
demand 
elasticity 
(η) 
Levies (%) 
National 
optimum 
(τ × 100) 
Producer 
optimum 
(τ p × 100) 
Matching grants (%) 
(g × 100) 
(d = 0.0) (d = 0.2) 
100 (%) ∞ 
20 
10 
5 
1 
∞ 
20 
10 
5 
1 
0.25 
0.23 
0.20 
0.15 
0.00 
0.25 
0.23 
0.20 
0.15 
0.00 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
80 (%) ∞ 
20 
10 
5 
1 
∞ 
16.0 
8.0 
4.0 
0.8 
0.25 
0.23 
0.20 
0.16 
0.00 
0.25 
0.22 
0.19 
0.13 
0.00 
0.0 
2.9 
6.6 
19.6 
0.0 
0.0 
2.4 
5.5 
16.3 
0.0 
50 (%) ∞ 
20 
10 
5 
1 
∞ 
10.1 
5.1 
2.6 
0.6 
0.25 
0.23 
0.21 
0.18 
0.09 
0.25 
0.20 
0.15 
0.06 
0.00 
0.0 
12.4 
32.3 
166.7 
– 
0.0 
10.3 
26.9 
138.9 
– 
20 (%) ∞ 
20 
10 
5 
1 
∞ 
4.1 
2.1 
1.2 
0.4 
0.25 
0.23 
0.22 
0.21 
0.20 
0.25 
0.13 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.0 
74.1 
1000.0 
– 
– 
0.0 
61.7 
833.3 
– 
– 
Non-traded – 0.2 0.25 0.00 – – 
Entries are based on domestic supply and demand elasticities of ε = 2.0, and ηd = 0.2 
η = κηd + (1 − κ )ηe. 
rate of  matching grant, but the implied rate is very sensitive to changes in 
the parameters. In contrast, in the case of  a parallel research-induced shift 
in supply, the optimal levy rates chosen by both the nation and producers 
for all market circumstances described in table 5 would be 1 per cent for a 
supply elasticity of  1 and 0.5 per cent for a supply elasticity of  2, with no 
inﬂuence by the export demand elasticity or share of  product exported on 
the levy rate. 
6. Some caveats 
We have assumed that all of  the beneﬁts and costs of  the levy-funded 
research accrue to the producers and consumers of  the commodity being 
levied. This assumption has a number of  elements, which we will address in 
turn.16 First, the assumption ignores spillover beneﬁts of  research to other 
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commodities and public good beneﬁts, such as the beneﬁts to the wider soci­
ety from, say, greater environmental amenity and biodiversity. Of  course 
this is unrealistic; however, in practice only a small share of  the funds dis­
tributed by Australian RDCs has gone to projects for basic research or to 
generate public good type environmental beneﬁts.17 In contrast, technology 
resulting from levy-funded research might nevertheless entail substantial 
positive or negative externalities (associated with the environment, food 
safety, or something else) and to the extent that this is so there will be 
divergences between social and private beneﬁts and hence between social 
and private optimal research levy rates, even when research causes a paral­
lel shift in the supply function. 
Second, the competitive market model assumes negligible policy distortions, 
and also the absence of  external costs and beneﬁts, for the commodity. The 
absence of  agricultural policy interventions is a reasonable assumption for 
almost all Australian agricultural commodities. The associated assumption 
of  no market power of  ﬁrms is satisfactory for farm production and also on 
the commodity demand side when the actual and potential threat of  inter­
national trade is recognised. However, agricultural policy distortions are of 
signiﬁcance for most countries. As shown by Alston et al. (1988), Martin 
and Alston (1994), Alston and Martin (1995) and others, policy distortions 
alter the total beneﬁts from R&D, and especially the distribution of  bene­
ﬁts between producers and other groups in society. Extrapolating from 
these studies we can infer that policy distortions could result in substantial 
discrepancies between the levy rates that would maximise beneﬁts to pro­
ducers versus society. The same results also would suggest that the nature 
and extent of  the differences between producer and national optimal levy 
rates will depend crucially on the details of  the policy, the international 
trade status of  the commodity, and the type of  supply curve shift. Similar 
16 We can interpret these elements as left out beneﬁts (or costs) accruing to the economy 
more broadly, to producers and consumers of  closely related commodities, to technology 
suppliers or other agribusiness ﬁrms that have market power in the commodity or the techno­
logy, to consumers of  environmental amenities, or to taxpayers through government revenues 
where commodity price policies are applied. 
17 AFFA (2002) report that many RDC projects provide beneﬁts for the environment, 
food safety and for regions. Arguably, most of  these beneﬁts accrue to the producers and 
consumers of  the commodities, and are fully reﬂected in the returns to producers, consum­
ers, and society, as measured in the present paper. Some other beneﬁts reduce external costs 
associated with production and can be regarded as savings to producers through reduced 
costs of  current or future regulations or taxes on pollution externalities. A relatively small 
share of  the research beneﬁts from these projects have public-good properties that would 
show up in social beneﬁts but not in beneﬁts to producers or consumers. Also, those RDCs 
most involved in supporting projects yielding public-good environmental beneﬁts, for 
example Land and Water Australia, are fully government funded with no producer levy. 
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ﬁndings would apply where markets are distorted as a result of  market 
power of  ﬁrms or environmental externalities (e.g., see Alston et al. 1995). 
Third, our analysis ignores cross-commodity impacts of  the collection of 
the levy or the research it is used to fund. It is easy to imagine a scenario 
in which research on one commodity (and, indeed, the levy to fund it) has 
signiﬁcant impacts on the market for another commodity that is closely 
related in production, consumption, or both (for instance, beef  and lamb in 
Australia or beef  and pork in the USA). Our partial equilibrium model 
assumes that second-round and feedback effects of  changes in the commod­
ity studied on prices and quantities in the rest of  the economy are of  second-
order importance. Given the relative unimportance of the agricultural sector, 
it seems reasonable to prefer the simplicity of  a partial equilibrium model 
versus a general equilibrium model, but in some cases a multi-commodity 
model may be necessary to capture all the relevant effects. Again, this is an 
empirical issue, to be determined on a case by case basis. 
Fourth, we have ignored the possibility of  technology ﬁrms having mar­
ket power – through patents, trade secrets or other forms of  intellectual 
property – in either the technology being produced or the technology it 
replaces. If  ﬁrms have property rights over technologies, and collect 
monopoly rents accordingly, then a complete analysis of  the social beneﬁts 
must account for changes in rents to technology providers, which do not 
show up in the commodity market measures of  consumer and producer 
surplus (e.g., see Moschini and Lapan 1997). Further, levy-funded research 
results might be subject to intellectual property protection with implica­
tions for the total beneﬁts and their distribution. These aspects are prob­
ably of  minor importance in the context of  Australian levy-funded research 
to date, but are likely to become more important with time. 
We can anticipate some general implications of  these various factors. To 
the extent that there are spillovers or other beneﬁts beyond the producers 
and consumers of  the commodity being levied, our results understate the 
social beneﬁts from the R&D, and they understate the desirable level of 
matching government grant. On the other hand, when new agricultural 
technology results in excessive consumption of  natural resource stocks or 
involves other negative externalities, or other costs beyond the commodity 
being levied, the converse may be true. To make more speciﬁc statements 
would require more speciﬁc information. In the Australian context, how­
ever, we would suggest that for most commodities and for most types of 
levy-funded research, it is not unreasonable to set these complications aside 
for the type of  work being done in the present paper. 
Finally, our results are based on a premise that total producer surplus 
(measured off  the commodity supply function at wholesale, say) is the 
relevant measure of  beneﬁts to be maximised by the RDC. Increasingly, 
 
  
 
 
  
however, RDCs are being directed to consider community-wide priorities – 
such as concerns with externalities associated with agricultural production 
– when allocating funds, and they have to report against them as an ele­
ment of  meeting requirements for the matching government grants. The 
extent to which such externalities exist or are effectively addressed and mit­
igated by RDC-funded research remains a matter for speculation. Never­
theless, it seems likely that the concern with community-wide impacts has 
received enough attention such that it is an effective constraint on the RDC 
research portfolios, to the extent that RDCs will have changed both their 
true research priorities and how they report their actions and achievements. 
If  such a constraint is meaningful, the producer beneﬁt from a given 
amount of  research spending will be lower while the social beneﬁt may be 
higher or lower, with an ambiguous effect on the size of  the discrepancy 
between the private and social optimal levy rates, and the rate of  matching 
government grant. In addition, where levy-funded research has unequal 
impacts on heterogeneous producers, it may be too simple to assume that 
the RDC chooses a levy rate and a research portfolio strictly aiming to 
maximise total producer net beneﬁts, without regard to the distribution of 
those beneﬁts among producers.18 An extension to allow for more complex 
objective functions would be challenging and is beyond the scope of  the 
present work. 
7. Conclusion 
It has been suggested by some authors that compulsory levy-based funding 
supported by matching government grants is, in principle, a fair and efﬁ­
cient way of  ﬁnancing applied agricultural research, and that this approach 
helps account for Australia’s comparatively high public agricultural re­
search intensity ratio (e.g., Alston et al. 1999). Some have quantiﬁed the 
implications of  these arrangements for the distribution of  the beneﬁts and 
costs of  different types of  agricultural research (e.g., Mullen et al. 1989; 
Zhao 2003; Zhao et al. 2003). In the present paper we have questioned 
some of  the premises from the previous studies concerning the fairness and 
efﬁciency of  levy-based funding. To do this we formally modelled the deci­
sion calculus of producer bodies such as RDCs, and compared their optimal 
rates of  research levies with the rates that would be optimal for the nation 
as a whole. We explored how this comparison depends on the nature of  the 
research-induced technical change and market conditions such as the 
18 A reviewer suggested that unequal impacts among heterogeneous producers might be 
a further reason why a matching grant may be required to encourage producer organisa­
tions to implement research levies. Alston (2002) offers some more detailed discussion. 
 
  
elasticities of  supply and demand, and the country’s trade status in the 
commodity in question. 
A conventional approach would use producer surplus measured off  the 
commodity supply function as the maximand for the RDC, with national 
beneﬁts equal to the sum of  producer surplus and domestic consumer sur­
plus. Hence, we assumed all the beneﬁts and costs of  the levy and the 
research it funds accrue to the producers and consumers of  the commodity 
– that is, there are no inter-industry spillover effects of  the R&D, and any 
effects of  distortions arising from government price policies, market power 
of  ﬁrms, and external beneﬁts and costs in production, are minimal. Using 
this approach, producer incentives and national interests coincide exactly 
for levy-funded research under a range of  circumstances. These include 100 
per cent levy funding that gives rise to a parallel research-induced supply 
shift, regardless of  the demand elasticity, or a pivotal research-induced sup­
ply shift when demand is perfectly elastic or all of  the product is exported. 
In the pivotal case, when demand slopes down, the producer optimum is 
less than the national optimum. Importantly, when demand is inelastic, or 
demand is less elastic than supply, the producer optimum is zero, even 
when some investment in research is clearly in society’s interest. 
Our analysis provides several observations on the virtues of  match­
ing government grants for producer levies for research. Where demand is 
perfectly elastic or all production is exported, or where research leads to 
parallel supply curve shifts, producers already have appropriate incentives in 
the absence of  a matching grant. More generally, with pivotal supply curve 
shifts and a less than inﬁnitely elastic demand, the required matching grant 
to induce producer decisions consistent with the social optimum varies with 
the export share and with the elasticities of  product demand and supply, 
and only by coincidence would the socially optimal matching grant be dollar 
for dollar. When demand is inelastic, or the demand elasticity is less than 
the supply elasticity, producers will choose a zero levy rate regardless of  the 
matching grant. Against these observations, current general policy of  a 
blanket dollar for dollar matching grant is clearly sub-optimal, even with­
out the complications of  spillovers, environmental impacts, commodity 
price policies, or other distortions. The socially optimal policy is strictly an 
empirical question that will vary from industry to industry and case to case, 
and within industries, among different types of  levy-funded research. Theor­
etical analysis such as that in the present paper, alone, cannot answer this 
question but has demonstrated the importance of  further work to pursue a 
speciﬁc answer. 
Clearly, our simplifying assumptions of  no spillover R&D beneﬁts and 
no market distortions will not ﬁt the facts for every situation, and the 
implications of  relaxing these assumptions represent areas for further 
 
  
  
model development as well as qualiﬁcations to the policy implications. The 
simplifying assumptions are not unreasonable for the Australian setting. 
For most projects, but certainly not all projects, funded by RDCs in Aus­
tralia, in our judgement the majority of  anticipated beneﬁts, including 
those directed at the environment and food safety, initially go to producers 
and consumers of  the products. For Australian primary industries, distor­
tions from government policies are small, but obviously this is not the case 
for many other countries. On the other hand, in some cases production 
involves external costs, for example waste chemicals, and these will imply 
different relations between social and producer beneﬁts from various types 
of  research than those considered in the present paper. And, as noted 
above, heterogeneity of  producers means that the assumed RDC objective 
of  maximising producer surplus may be too simple. The incorporation of 
such complications can be expected to add to the potential for discrepancies 
between national and producer optimal choices, reinforcing the conclusion 
that the simple blanket policy of  1:1 matching grants is likely to be subop­
timal but that to do better is likely to require speciﬁc, careful, and difﬁcult 
empirical analysis. 
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Appendix 
The equations for the optimal levy rates discussed in sections 3 and 4 are 
derived below. 
Parallel supply curve shift 
For the case of  a parallel shift in supply, the equilibrium quantity and price 
are found by solving equations (6) and (7), namely: 
α R − tγ − ( )
Q = (21)1 δ + β 
 
   
 
  
  
 
  
    
  
    
  
    
  
    
  
  
  
  
  
    
  
  
    
  
δα  R + δ tγ β  + ( )
P = (22)1 δ + β 
where P1 is the consumer price, gross of  tax, and the producer price is given 
by P1 − t. 
Recall the expression for net national surplus allowing for trade and the 
marginal excess burden of  taxation (equation (9)): 
1 2  g  NS1 = (κδ  + β )Q1 − (1 + d )   R . (23)2 1 + g 
Differentiating with respect to R, the ﬁrst-order condition for the optimum is: 
∂ NS ∂Q  g 1 
= (κδ  + β )Q1 1 − (1 + d )   = 0, or (24)∂R ∂R 1 + g 
∂Q1 (1 + d ) g
= . (25)∂R Q1(κδ  + β) 1 + g 
Differentiating the solution for Q1 in equation (21) with respect to R, 
∂Q1 1 ∂α ∂t 
= −  + . (26) ∂R δ + β ∂R ∂R 
Further, differentiating the market-clearing condition 
R = (1 + g) tQ (27) 
with respect to R, and simplifying, 
∂t  1 1 ∂Q  
= t  −  . (28)∂R R Q ∂R 
Substituting the expression for ∂t /∂R from equation (28) into equation (26), 
and deﬁning εC,R = −∂α /∂R · R/P, we obtain an alternative expression for 
∂Q1 /∂R that holds at the equilibrium: 
∂Q1 εC R, P1 − t 
(29)∂R = t(1 + g) [  Q (δ + β ) − t] . 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
    
  
  
    
  
  
  
  
    
  
    
  
  
    
  
  
Setting the expression for ∂Q1 /∂R from the ﬁrst-order condition, equation 
(25), equal to the expression for ∂Q1 /∂R from the market clearing condi­
tions, equation (29), we can eliminate the ∂Q1 /∂R terms altogether and 
solve for the optimal levy rate τ = t/P: 
−1 −1 2  η ε η ε+ ηε +  
= C R  1 d g   + ) (1 d g  .τ ε  , 1 + +  ( ) τ (1 + d g  1 + +  ) η κε  ( + ε) ε+ η κ η κ+   
(30) 
For typical values of τ, well less than 0.01, the last term in equation (30) 
will be very close to zero and we can use equation (10) above, which ex­
cludes the last term, as an approximation. Further, when g = 0, as is optimal 
for a parallel supply shift, the last term equals zero. 
For the producer optimum, the objective function is (equation (12)): 
1 2PS1 = βQ1 , (31)2 
and setting the derivative with respect to R equal to zero yields the ﬁrst-
order condition for the producer’s maximisation problem: 
∂Q1 
= 0.  (32)∂R 
Equations (26) through (29) still hold, because they are implied by the market-
clearing conditions, so that 
=
εQ R,τ ε  C R  = . (33)p , ε 
Pivotal supply curve shift 
For the case of  a pivotal shift in supply, the equilibrium quantity and price 
are found by solving equations (14) and (15): 
− −  tγ α  
Q = (34)2 + φ Rδ β ( )  
R + δ + tγ βφ ( )  α δ  
P = (35)2 + φ Rδ β ( )  
 
   
   
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
    
  
      
  
  
    
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
where P2 is the consumer price, gross of  tax, and the producer price is given 
by P2 − t. 
Recall the expression for net national surplus (equation (16)): 
1 2  g  NS2 = (κδ  + βφ  (R Q 2 − 1 + d )   R . (36)) (2 1 + g 
Differentiating with respect to R, the ﬁrst-order condition for the optimum 
is: 
∂NS β ∂φ  ∂Q  g 2 2 2
= Q 2 + (κδ  + βφ  )Q2 − (1 + d )   = 0, or (37)∂R 2 ∂R ∂R 1 + g 
∂Q2 1  g β 2 ∂φ   
= (1 + d ) − Q 2  . (38)∂R Q2(κδ  + βφ  )  (1 + g) 2 ∂R 
Using the deﬁnition of εQ,R = − (∂φ /∂R)R, equation (38) simpliﬁes to: 
∂Q t ( + d g  + β ε2 1 ) Q2 2 Q R
=
, (39)∂R t ( + g κδ 22 1 )(  + βφ )Q 
Differentiating the solution for Q2 in equation (34) with respect to R, 
∂Q 1  ∂t ∂φ 2 
= −   + Q2β  . (40)∂R δ + βφ  ∂R ∂R 
The expression for ∂ t /∂R in equation (28) is still valid, since the deﬁnition 
of  research spending holds regardless of  the assumption about the type of 
research-induced supply shift. Substituting the expression for ∂ t /∂R into 
equation (40) and using the deﬁnition of εQ,R = −(∂φ /∂R)R, we obtain an 
alternative expression for ∂Q2/∂R that holds at the equilibrium: 
∂Q 2 εQ R, βQ2 − t 
= . (41)∂R t(1 + g)[  Q2(δ + βφ  ) − t] 
Setting the expression for ∂Q2/∂R from the ﬁrst-order condition, equation 
(39), equal to the expression for ∂Q2/∂R from the market clearing conditions, 
 
 
   
  
 
  
  
        
 
        
  
  
  
  
  
  
equation (41), we can eliminate the ∂Q2/∂R terms altogether and solve for 
the optimal levy rate τ = t /P: 
ε ,  2 η κ ε) −  +  η ε  ) Q R  ( + (τ =  
ε 2(η κ ε) + ( + d g η ε  ηεQ R,  + 2 1  ) ( + −  )
 2 1( + ) ηε 2 d g+ τ   . (42)η κ+ ε) + 2  1  ( + ) ( + −  Q R 2( d g  )η ε  ηε ,  
For typical values of τ and εQ,R, both well less than 0.01, the last term in 
equation (42) will be very close to zero and we can use equation (17) above, 
which excludes the last term from (42), as an approximation. 
For the producer optimum, the objective function is (equation (18)): 
1 2PS2 = βφ R Q 2 , (43)( )2 
and setting the derivative with respect to R equal to zero yields the ﬁrst-
order condition for the producer’s maximum: 
∂Q ε ,2 
=
Q R  . (44)∂R 2 1 + g)t ( 
Equation (41) still holds, because it is implied by the market-clearing con­
ditions. Setting equation (41) equal to equation (44) allows us to solve for 
the producer’s optimal levy rate: 
εQ R  η ε  ,  −τ p =   , (45)2 − εQ R   ηε , 
which is approximated by equation (19), which is good for typical values of 
εQ,R, less than 0.01. 
 
